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It is now well established that world-wide demographic shifts are
going to affect both the U.S. and world economies in ways that are not
entirely predictable. What we can do—and what Ronald Lee and Ryan
Edwards do so well—is to plot out for the future some of the ﬁscal
implications under reasonable guesses about demographic, economic,
and legal factors. These factors include what we know already from the
past, such as the maximum number of people in the world of any age
over 0 next year and over 10 in another ten years. A typical next step is
to posit what in estimating circles is known as “current law” (deﬁned
partly by convention, not just law). Even if that law cannot possibly be
maintained, some of its implications can be understood. Finally, one
assumes some reasonable parameters, such as future fertility, mortality,
and labor force participation, largely based on historical trends.
Some argue that long-term estimates should not be made because we
know so little about the future. But this argument ignores what we do
know, largely derived from demographic data. The more important point
is that we must do long-term projections if government is going to make
promises for the long term. It is the government (or private sector)
contract that makes assumptions, largely implicit, about what is afford-
able in the future. If making projections for 50, 75, or 100 years is
relatively new in our history, so also is a government making promises
about how future income growth in the economy will be spent in 50, 100,
and 200 years. The analyst or economist or actuary is forced to derive the
implications of contracts and to try to make them explicit. Many of the
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against long-term commitments that make the estimates necessary.
It is hard to ﬁnd fault with the Lee/Edwards paper. Their way of
presenting the numbers is often insightful and unique. What I would like
to do, therefore, is to reﬂect on the ﬁscal impact they address but in some
alternative ways. In a sense, I am simply examining the same building but
from a different vantage point. I will speak brieﬂy to three issues:
Aging. The picture of aging looks different if we separate the effects
of living longer from lower fertility rates. When the two factors are
combined, it gives a distorted view of total need and relative need in the
population, and a misleading impression of how labor force participation
rates change over time. I suggest that often we ought to use “age from
death” rather than “age from birth” in performing different types of
analyses.
Human Capital. An alternative model for projecting ﬁscal pressures is
to examine what we are scheduling in the way of idle or wasted human
capital. Closely related and largely ignored to date is how the soon-
scheduled continual drop in adult employment rates may affect the
macroeconomy.
Budget Trends beyond Aging. Finally, I believe that we should view
ﬁscal pressures as arising as much from trying to stay on past trend
lines—an impossibility by itself—as from any relative aging of the
population. The rising costs of relative aging would be much more
affordable if they were not reinforced by such factors as more years in
retirement and the ways that public and private health insurance encour-
age the adoption of cost-increasing technology in health care.
Brieﬂy now to each of these points.
AGING
Sometimes we are trapped by our own language. Aging is a term so
commonly used that it goes undeﬁned. Conventional use of the term for
the individual refers to attaining a ﬁxed age such as 65, and societal aging
is commonly deﬁned in similar terms, such as percentage of the popula-
tion over age 65. This is highly misleading.
In fact, growth in the percentage of the population attaining a given
age is derived from two very different factors—longer life expectancies
and changes in fertility rates. Longer life expectancies generally mean
that individuals are better off, by having more years to live, and there is
increasing evidence that individuals are in better average health at any
age.
By contrast, lower fertility rates mean that the percentage of the
population in, say, the latter half or the last 10 percent of their lives will
rise relative to the population as a whole. If people’s health problems get
worse and costs arise as they approach, say, the last ﬁve years of their
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less will go up in a society simply because a larger share of the population
will have that short life expectancy.
Let me give three examples of how reporting on aging can affect our
perceptions. First, much of the increased cost of Social Security over time
is associated with its de-emphasis on putting money where needs are
greatest. Thus, people now retire close to ﬁve years earlier than when the
system was ﬁrst established, and they are living about ﬁve years longer
(these factors are not additive). In 1968, 48 percent of beneﬁts to males
were paid to those with life expectancies of ten years or more; today it is
62 percent and rising (Figure 1). Similarly, if we were measuring true
needs, we would worry more about those periods when individuals are
likely to have greater physical, medical, long-term care, and other real
needs, that is, in the last years of life. The 2040 problem is more “real” in
this sense than is the problem of 2020.
As a second example, I believe many of our estimates can be
misleading and our regressions incorrectly speciﬁed. Take some of the
elementary comparisons made at this conference—for example, measur-
ing dependency ratios over time. The common method is take a group,
say, those under age 18, and compare them not to those with, say, 18
years of life expectancy but with those who have attained age 65. Only
when measuring ﬁscal promises that use a ﬁxed age for beneﬁt eligibility
is this appropriate, not when measuring dependency as a need.
Finally, Figure 2 shows labor force participation rates as measured
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ancy). Men aged 65 in 1997 had about 16 years of life expectancy. When
we trace labor force participation rates of men at age 65, they decline
fairly continually until very recently. However, when we examine past
labor force participation rates of men with 16 years of life expectancy, we
ﬁnd that they remain fairly ﬂat at high levels until just about the time that
an early retirement age of 62 comes along and Medicare is made
available. If one were to run a regression on labor force participation, he
might obtain a very different result if he used age from death rather than
chronological age. When chronological age is an independent variable,
the implicit assumption is that a person aged 65 in 1950, all other things
being equal, should be considered equivalent to a person aged 65 in 2000.
HUMAN CAPITAL
Since people now retire on public pension systems for about the last
third of their adult lives, these systems must be considered middle-age as
well as old-age retirement programs. One cannot ascertain the ﬁscal
impact by looking merely at the effect on retirement beneﬁts. The reduced
output associated with more retirement years is a multiple of the beneﬁts
that are paid; dropping out of the workforce reduces the level of output
in society, raises the level of lifetime needs of the retirees not covered out
of their own income, and raises the level of general revenue per
remaining worker that must be collected to pay for education, defense,
and everything else.
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human beings as suddenly becoming unproductive when they reach a
certain number of years past birth. Largely a vision taken from nineteenth
and early twentieth century industrial society, human capital is treated
analogously to physical capital that depreciates like the “one-hoss shay,”
a buggy that needed few repairs until it suddenly fell apart and had to be
replaced.
President Franklin Roosevelt argued that the increasing physical
demands of an industrial society meant that people required more
retirement years. If this was true, then the corresponding argument is that
in an economy with decreasing reliance on physical labor and ever better
health care, there is less need over time to retire at any given age.
Figure 3 highlights the human capital question in another way. One
line shows the labor force participation rates of males aged 55 and over.
It is this type of trend that is projected forward to forecast the future. That
is, age-sex-speciﬁc labor force participation rates are projected forward in
ways that tend to keep them relatively constant because they fell for
several decades for older men. But the other line shows that throughout
the post-World War II period, the adult labor force participation rate
went up essentially in every non-recession year. Of course, women’s
increased participation was more than offsetting the rise in retirement
years mainly for men. One interpretation is that this was primarily a
sociological phenomenon related to greater civil rights for women,
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demand that is driven by the consumption opportunities available to the
public. If one projects on the basis of total labor force participation, one
gets a very different perception of how much the labor supply of older
workers would increase.
I conclude that most projections of labor supply into the future are
basically partial equilibrium models and that a more general equilibrium
approach would give greater recognition to the demand for labor and a
more sanguine view of the future. What is hard to separate out, however,
is the extent to which it is necessary to open the policy dams, that is,
change government policy, to let ﬂow the natural economic forces of
private labor supply and demand.
If I am wrong, and current types of projections are right, they imply
that the adult employment rate would fall by the equivalent of 0.3 or 0.4
percent of the labor force almost every year for twenty years or more
running. (This can be seen in Figure 4, which measures the adult
non-employment rate as a percent of a larger denominator, total adult
population, over time under conventional assumptions for the future.)
Macroeconomists are used to indicating that such a decline in the
employment rate due to unemployment is often recessionary in its effect
on the economy, but we in the United States have never had this type of
continual negative impact on the employment rate. Moreover, the pro-
jection goes entirely contrary to the entire postwar experience of an
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believe, need much further examination.
THE BUDGET
My ﬁnal point is simply that much of the ﬁscal impact we are
examining is not the effect of relative aging but is caused by other
factors—in particular, other sources of built-in growth in programs
largely devoted to the aged.
I show this brieﬂyi naf e wﬁgures. Figure 5 shows how federal
spending on retirement and health has risen from about 10 percent of the
U.S. budget in 1950 to over 50 percent today. And it is rising well before
the baby boomers start retiring. A similar trend can be shown for all
developed countries. Figure 6, based on current projections, shows this
ﬁscal trend continuing—with Social Security, Medicare, and long-term
care under Medicaid essentially absorbing almost all the growth in
revenues over time. Figure 7 shows how rising levels of lifetime beneﬁts
in retirement are independent of any aging of the population due to
relative aging or drops in fertility rates.
Finally, Figure 8 shows some of the ways that public and private
health insurance has set up a health care market with the extraordinarily
unusual and unsustainable tendency to be a growth sector that empha-
sizes cost-increasing technology. Quantity and price measures provided
by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis show that almost all other
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economy, and that these relative price decreases have gone hand-in-hand
with technological improvement that should increase the depreciation
rate on old ways of doing things. Health care, by contrast, displays
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ing at the same time. I realize the inherent difﬁculties in using these
measures—not the least of which are problems with trying to measure
quality increases and the inherent inconsistencies in price and quantity
indices over time—but the numbers are revealing nonetheless. (Their
problems, by the way, also carry over to other measures such as gross
domestic product, inﬂation, and productivity of the economy as a whole.)
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In summary, Lee and Edwards have done us a service in measuring
the ﬁscal impact of existing policy under a reasonable set of assumptions.
But other important steps are required: (1) We need to be careful to
distinguish those individual needs and behavioral patterns that arise
from the relative aging of the population. (2) We need to pay attention to
the micro and macro impacts associated with the signiﬁcant jump now
scheduled in the share of human capital that will be wasted. (3) We
should continually examine those ﬁscal or budgetary problems that are
caused by rising costs independent of any increase over time in the share
of the population with a ﬁxed remaining life span.
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